NON STATE ACTOR CYBERATTACKS AND THE COMPLEXITY OF STATE ATTRIBUTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

Abstract

This research  investigates the difficulties associated with ascertaining which governments are accountable for cyberattacks in accordance with international law, as well as the increasing danger posed by cyberattacks perpetrated by non-state groups. This paper investigates the ways in which the decentralized, anonymous, and global nature of cyberspace threatens the well-established legal principles that regulate the culpability of states. This is particularly relevant in cases where criminal networks, hacktivist groups, terrorist organizations, or private individuals are conducting operations on the internet, regardless of whether the state is involved. The paper examines the legal standards of attribution outlined in the Papers on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), as well as relevant international law and developing state practice, in order to emphasize the evidentiary and technical challenges associated with establishing an adequate connection between non-state actors and states. It is also feasible to assess the effectiveness of current international legal frameworks, including the United Nations Charter and laws that regulate the use of force, in relation to cyber operations that do not qualify as armed conflict. As a means of ensuring effective legal accountability and contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security, this paper advocates for the gradual establishment of international cyber norms, stronger evidentiary standards, and improved international cooperation. It accomplishes this by emphasizing deficiencies in accountability frameworks and attribution mechanisms.